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Abstract
As the popularity of content sharing websites such as
YouTube and Flickr has increased, they have become tar-
gets for spam, phishing and the distribution of malware. On
YouTube, the facility for users to post comments can be used
by spam campaigns to direct unsuspecting users to bogus e-
commerce websites. In this paper, we demonstrate how such
campaigns can be tracked over time using network motif pro-
filing, i.e. by tracking counts of indicative network motifs.
By considering all motifs of up to five nodes, we identify dis-
criminating motifs that reveal two distinctly different spam
campaign strategies. One of these strategies uses a small
number of spam user accounts to comment on a large number
of videos, whereas a larger number of accounts is used with
the other. We present an evaluation that uses motif profiling
to track two active campaigns matching these strategies, and
identify some of the associated user accounts.
Introduction
The usage and popularity of content sharing websites con-
tinues to rise each year. For example, the number of Flickr
uploads has risen to a total of six billion images, having in-
creased annually by 20% over the past five years1. Simi-
larly, YouTube now receives more than three billion views
per day, with forty-eight hours of video being uploaded ev-
ery minute; increases of 50% and 100% respectively over
the previous year2. Unfortunately, such increases have also
resulted in these sites becoming more lucrative targets for
spammers hoping to attract unsuspecting users to malicious
websites, where a variety of threats such as scams (phishing,
e-commerce) and malware can be found. This is a particular
problem for YouTube given its facility to host discussions
in the form of video comments (Sureka 2011). Opportuni-
ties exist for the abuse of this feature with the availability
of bots3 that can be used to post spam comments in large
volumes.
1http://news.softpedia.com/news/
Flickr-Boasts-6-Billion-Photo-Uploads-215380.
shtml
2http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2011/
05/thanks-youtube-community-for-two-big.
html
3http://youtubebot.com/
Figure 1: Strategies of two spam campaigns targeting
YouTube in 2011 - small number of accounts each com-
menting on many videos (left), and larger number of ac-
counts each commenting on few videos (right). Blue nodes
are videos, red nodes are accounts marked as spam, beige
nodes are spam accounts not marked accordingly.
Our investigation has found that bot-posted spam com-
ments are often associated with orchestrated campaigns that
can remain active for long periods of time, where the pri-
mary targets are popular videos. Such campaigns tend to
employ a variety of detection evasion techniques, such as
variants of the same fundamental message content, perhaps
with different website domains, and an ever-evolving set of
fake user accounts. An initial manual analysis of data gath-
ered from YouTube revealed activity from a number of cam-
paigns, two of which can be seen in Figure 1. The results
presented in this paper confirm the presence of these cam-
paigns, along with their recurring nature.
As an alternative to traditional approaches that attempt to
detect spam on an individual (comment) level (e.g. domain
blacklists), this paper presents an evaluation of the detec-
tion of these recurring campaigns using network analysis,
based on networks derived from the comments posted by
users to videos. This approach uses the concept of network
motif profiling (Milo et al. 2002; 2004; Wu, Harrigan, and
Cunningham 2011), where motif counts from the derived
networks are tracked over time. Given that different cam-
paign strategies can exist (see Figure 1), the objective is to
discover certain discriminating motifs that can be used to
identify particular strategies and the associated users as they
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periodically recur.
This paper begins with a description of related work in
the domain. The collection of contemporary YouTube data,
comprised of comments posted to the most popular videos
over a period of time, is then discussed. Next, the method-
ology used by the detection approach is described in detail,
from derivation of the comment-based networks to the sub-
sequent network motif profile generation. The results of an
experiment for a seventy-two hour period are then presented.
These results demonstrate the use of certain discriminating
motifs to identify some of the users associated with two sep-
arate campaigns we have discovered within this time period.
Further analysis of the campaign websites is also provided.
Finally, the overall conclusions are discussed, and some sug-
gestions for future work are made.
Related Work
Structural and spam analysis
The network structure of YouTube has been analysed in a
number of separate studies. Paolillo et al. (2008) investi-
gated the social structure with the generation of a user net-
work based on the friendship relationship, focusing on the
degree distribution. They found that YouTube is similar to
other online social networks with respect to degree distri-
bution, and that a social core exists between authors (up-
loaders) of videos. An alternative network based on related
videos was analysed by Cheng et al. (2008). Given that the
resulting networks were not strongly connected, attention
was reserved for the largest strongly connected components.
These components were found to exhibit small-world char-
acteristics (Watts and Strogatz 1998), with large clustering
coefficients and short characteristic path lengths, indicating
the presence of dense clusters of related videos.
Benevenuto et al. (2008a) created a directed network
based on videos and their associated responses. Similarly,
they found that using the largest strongly connected com-
ponents was more desirable due to the large clustering co-
efficients involved. This was a precursor to subsequent
work concerned with the detection of spammers and con-
tent promoters within YouTube (Benevenuto et al. 2008b;
2009). Features from the video responses networks (e.g.
clustering coefficient, reciprocity) were used as part of a
larger set to classify users accordingly. Other YouTube spam
investigations include the recent work of Sureka (2011),
based on the detection of spam within comments posted to
videos. A number of features were derived to analyse the
overall activity of users, rather than focusing on individual
comment detection.
An extensive body of work has been dedicated to the anal-
ysis of spam within other online social networking sites. For
example, Mishne et al. (2005) suggested an approach for the
detection of link spam within blog comments using the com-
parison of language models. Gao et al. (2010) investigated
the proliferation of spam within Facebook “wall” messages,
with the detection of spam clusters using networks based on
message similarity. This particular study demonstrated the
bursty (recurring) and distributed aspects of botnet-driven
spam campaigns, as discussed by Xie et al. (2008). The
shortcomings of URL blacklists for the prevention of spam
on Twitter were highighted by Grier et al. (2010), where it
was found that blacklist update delays of up to twenty days
can occur. This is a particular problem with the use of short-
ened URLs, the nature of which was recently analysed by
Chhabra et al. (2011).
Network motif analysis
Network motifs (Milo et al. 2002; Shen-Orr et al. 2002)
are structural patterns in the form of interconnected n-node
subgraphs that are considered to be inherent in many vari-
eties of network, such as biological, technological and so-
ciological networks. They are often used for the compari-
son of said networks, and can also indicate certain network
characteristics. In particular, the work of Milo et al. (2004)
proposed the use of significance profiles based on the motif
counts found within networks to enable the comparison of
local structure between networks of different sizes. In this
case, the generation of an ensemble of random networks was
required for each significance profile. An alternative to this
approach (Wu, Harrigan, and Cunningham 2011) involved
the use of motif profiles that did not entail random network
generation. Instead, profiles were created on an egocentric
basis for the purpose of characterising individual egos, en-
compassing the motif counts from the entirety of egocentric
networks within a particular network.
The domain of spam detection has also profited from the
use of network motifs or subgraphs. Within a network built
from email addresses (Boykin and Roychowdhury 2005), a
low clustering coefficient (based on the number of triangle
structures within a network) may indicate the presence of
spam addresses, with regular addresses generally forming
close-knit communities, i.e. a relatively higher number of
triangles. Becchetti et al. (2008) made use of the number of
triangles and clustering coefficient as features in the detec-
tion of web spam. These two features were found to rank
highly within an overall feature set. Motifs of size three
(triads) have also been used to detect spam comments in
networks generated from blog interaction (Kamaliha et al.
2008). It was found that certain motifs were likely to indi-
cate the presence of spam, based on comparison with corre-
sponding random network ensembles.
Separately, network motifs have also been used to char-
acterize network traffic (Allan, Turkett, and Fulp 2009). A
network was created for each application (e.g. HTTP, P2P
applications), and nodes within the network were classified
using corresponding motif profiles.
Data Collection
Following the lead of earlier related YouTube research, a
data set was collected in order to permit the investigation
of contemporary spam comment activity. An extensive
crawl of the YouTube network was performed by other re-
searchers (Paolillo 2008; Benevenuto et al. 2009). In our
case, we opted for a specific selection of the available data
given that spam comments in YouTube tend to be directed
towards a subset of the entire video set, i.e. more popu-
lar videos generally have a higher probability of attracting
attention from spammers, thus ensuring a larger audience.
This characteristic has also been seen on other online social
networks such as Twitter (Benevenuto et al. 2010).
Another issue to be considered is the accessibility of cer-
tain YouTube data attributes. The recent activity of a user
profile contains a number of potential attributes for use in
the derivation of representative networks, such as comments
posted to videos, and subscriptions added to other users.
Similarly, the list of subscribers for a particular user would
also be useful. However, access to these attributes can often
be restricted, meaning that reliance on such data may lead
to inaccuracies during subsequent experiments. On the con-
trary, comments (and the users who posted them) found on
a public video’s page are always accessible. Given these is-
sues, we decided to use only data to which access was not
restricted, namely the comments posted to videos along with
the associated user accounts.
Retrieval process
The data has been retrieved using the YouTube Data API4.
This API provides access to video and user profile informa-
tion. There are some limits associated with using the API, of
which further details are provided below. Apart from video
and user information, access is also provided to standard
feeds such as Most Viewed videos, Top Rated videos etc. The
fact that these feeds are periodically updated (usually daily)
facilitates our objective of analysing recurring spam cam-
paigns, as it enables the retrieval of popular videos (i.e. those
attracting spam comments) on a continual basis. Therefore,
the retrieval process is executed periodically as follows:
1. Retrieve the current video list from the most viewed stan-
dard feed for the US region (the API limits this to a max-
imum of 100 videos).
2. For each video in the list:
(a) If this video has not appeared in an earlier feed list,
retrieve its meta-data such as upload time, description
etc.
(b) Retrieve the comments and associated meta-data for the
last twenty-four hours, or those posted since the last
retrieval time (if more recent). The API limits the re-
turned comments to a maximum of 1,000.
3. In order to track the comment activity on particular videos
appearing intermittently in the most viewed feed, com-
ments are also retrieved for those videos not in the current
feed list that appeared in an earlier list from the previous
forty-eight hours.
Data set properties
Data retrieval began on October 31st, 2011, and details of
the videos and comments as of January 17th, 2012 can be
found in Table 15.
An interesting feature of the API is the spam hint prop-
erty provided within the video comment meta-data. This
4http://code.google.com/apis/youtube/
getting_started.html#data_api
5The data set is available at http://mlg.ucd.ie/yt
Videos 6,407
Total comments 6,431,471
Comments marked as spam 481,334
Total users 2,860,264
Spam comment users 177,542
Table 1: Data set properties
is set to true if a comment has previously been marked as
spam, either by the spam filter or manually with the “Flag
for spam” button available with each comment posted on
a video’s page. However, this property cannot be consid-
ered reliable due to its occasional inaccuracy, where inno-
cent comments can be marked as spam, while obvious spam
comments are not marked as such. This will be demon-
strated later in the results discussion. Similar evidence of
this property’s unreliability was also encountered in earlier
work (Sureka 2011).
Although the comment spam hint is used for approximate
annotation of the data (Table 1), it is not relied upon as a
label for the purposes of this evaluation. Other research in
this area (Benevenuto et al. 2009) performed manual label
annotation of YouTube data for use in subsequent classifi-
cation experiments. An accurate annotation process will be
considered in future work.
Methodology
Comment processing and network generation
Our methodology requires the generation of a network to
represent the comment posting activity of users to a set of
videos. Initially, comments made during a specified time
interval are selected from the data set discussed in the pre-
vious section. However, a number of pre-processing steps
must be executed before an appropriate network can be gen-
erated similar to those in Figure 1.
Spammers try to obfuscate the text of comments from a
particular campaign in order to bypass their detection by any
filters. Obfuscation techniques include the use of varying
amounts of additional characters (e.g. whitespace, Unicode
newlines, etc.) within the comment text, or different textual
formations (e.g. additional words, misspellings) of the same
fundamental message. Some examples of these can be seen
in the next section.
To counteract these efforts, each comment is converted to
a set of tokens. During this process, stopwords are removed,
along with any non-Latin-based words as the focus of this
evaluation is English-language spam comments. Punctua-
tion characters are also removed, and letters are converted
to lowercase. A modified comment text is then generated
from the concatenation of the generated tokens. As initial
analysis found that spam comments can often be longer than
regular comments, any texts shorter than a minimum length
(currently 25 characters) are removed at this point. Although
the campaign strategies under discussion here are concerned
with attracting users to remote sites through the inclusion of
URLs in comment text, comments without URLs are cur-
rently retained. This ensures the option of analysing other
types of spam campaigns, such as those encouraging chan-
nel views, i.e. promoters (Benevenuto et al. 2009), along
with the behaviour of regular users.
A network can then be generated from the remaining
modified comment texts. This network consists of two cat-
egories of node, users and videos. An undirected edge is
created between a user and a video if at least one comment
has been posted by the user on the video, where the edge
weight represents the number of comments in question. For
the moment, the weight is merely recorded but is not sub-
sequently used when counting motifs within the network.
To capture the relationship between the users involved in a
particular spam campaign, undirected and unweighted edges
are created between user nodes based on the similarity of
their associated comments. Each modified (tokenized) com-
ment text is converted to a set of hashes using the Rabin-
Karp rolling hash method (Karp and Rabin 1987), with a
sliding window length of 3. A pairwise distance matrix,
based on Jaccard distance, can then be generated from these
comment hash sets. For each pairwise comment distance be-
low a threshold (currently 0.6), an edge is created between
the corresponding users if one does not already exist.
Afterwards, any users whose set of adjacent nodes con-
sists solely of a single video node are removed. Since these
users have commented on only one video, and are in all like-
lihood not related to any other users, they are not considered
to be part of any spam campaign. The resulting network
tends to consist of one or more large connected components,
with a number of considerably smaller connected compo-
nents based on videos with a relatively minor amount of
comment activity. Finally, an approximate labelling of the
user nodes is performed, where users are labelled as spam
users if they posted at least one comment whose spam hint
property is set to true. All remaining users are labelled as
regular users. Although this can lead to label inaccuracies,
the results in the next section demonstrate that such inaccu-
racies will be perceivable.
Network motif profiles
Once the network has been generated, a set of egocentric
networks can be extracted. In this context, given that the
focus is on user activity, an ego is a user node, where its
egocentric network is the induced k-neighbourhood network
consisting of those user and video nodes whose distance
from the ego is at most k (currently 2). Motifs from size
three to five within the egocentric networks are then enumer-
ated using FANMOD (Wernicke and Rasche 2006). A set of
motif counts is maintained for each ego, where a count is in-
cremented for each motif instance found by FANMOD that
contains the ego.
A network motif count profile is then created for each ego.
As the number of possible motifs can be relatively large (par-
ticularly if directed and/or weighted edges are considered),
the length of this profile will vary for each network gener-
ated from a selection of comment data, rather than relying
upon a profile with a (large) fixed length. For a particular
generated network, the profiles will contain an entry for each
of the unique motifs found in the entirety of its constituent
egocentric networks. Any motifs not found for a particular
ego will have a corresponding value of zero in the associated
motif profile.
As mentioned previously, the work of Milo et al. (2004)
proposed the generation of a significance profile, where the
significance of a particular motif was calculated based on its
count in a network along with that generated by an ensemble
of corresponding random networks. These profiles then per-
mitted the subsequent comparison of different networks. In
this work, the egocentric networks are compared with each
other, and the generation of random ensembles is not per-
formed. An alternative ratio profile rp (Wu, Harrigan, and
Cunningham 2011) is created for each ego, where the ratio
value for a particular motif is based on the counts from all
of the egocentric networks, i.e.:
rpi =
nmpi − nmpi
nmpi + nmpi + 
(1)
Here, nmpi is the count of the ith motif in the ego’s motif
profile, nmpi is the average count of this motif for all motif
profiles, and  is a small integer that ensures that the ratio
is not misleadingly large when the motif occurs in only a
few egocentric networks. To adjust for scaling, a normalized
ratio profile nrp is then created for each ratio profile rpwith:
nrpi =
(
rpi∑
rp2i
) 1
2
(2)
The generated set of normalized ratio profiles usually con-
tain correlations between the motifs. Principal components
analysis (PCA) is used to adjust for these, acting as a dimen-
sionality reduction technique in the process. We can visual-
ize the first two principal components as a starting point for
our analysis. This is discussed in the next section.
Experiments and Results
For the purpose of this evaluation, the experiments were fo-
cused upon tracking two particular spam campaigns that we
discovered within the data set. The campaign strategies can
be seen in Figure 1, i.e. a small number of accounts each
commenting on many videos (Campaign 1), and a larger
number of accounts each commenting on few videos (Cam-
paign 2). A period of seventy-two hours was chosen where
these campaigns were active, starting on November 14th,
2011 and ending on November 17th, 2011.
In order to track the campaign activity over time, this pe-
riod was split into twelve windows of six hours each. For
each of these windows, a network of user and video nodes
was derived using the process described in the previous sec-
tion. A normalized ratio profile was generated for each ego
(user), based on the motif counts of the corresponding ego-
centric network. Principal components analysis was then
performed on these profiles to produce 2-dimensional spa-
tializations of the user nodes, using the first two components.
These spatializations act as the starting point for the analysis
of activity within a set of time windows.
Campaign 1
Campaign 2
Other spam users
Campaign 1
Campaign 2
Figure 2: Spatialization of the first two principal components of the normalized ratio profiles for Windows 10 and 11 (red nodes
are users with comments marked as spam, beige nodes are all other users). Both spam campaigns are highlighted.
Visualization and initial analysis
Having inspected all twelve six-hour windows, two windows
containing activity from both campaigns have been selected
for detailed analysis here. These are from November 17th,
2011; Window 10 (04:19:32 to 10:19:32) and Window 11
(10:19:32 to 16:19:32). Their derived network details can
be found in Table 2.
Window Video nodes User nodes (spam) Edges
10 263 295 (107) 907
11 296 523 (137) 1627
Table 2: Network details for Windows 10 and 11
A spatialization of the first two principal components of
the normalized ratio profiles for these windows can be found
in Figure 2. Users posting at least one comment marked
as spam (using the spam hint property) are in red, all other
users are in beige. The points corresponding to the spam
campaign users have been highlighted accordingly. From
the spatializations, it can be seen that in both windows:
1. The vast majority of users appear as overlapping points in
larger clusters (on the right and left respectively).
2. There is a clear distinction between the two different cam-
paign strategies, as these points are plotted separately
(both from regular users and each other).
3. The inaccuracy of the spam hint comment property is
demonstrated as the Campaign 2 clusters contain users
not coloured in red, i.e. none of their comments were
marked as spam (further details of these users can be seen
in Figure 4). Similarly, the reverse is true with the larger
clusters of regular users.
Apart from the highlighted campaign clusters, other spam
nodes in the spatializations have been correctly marked as
such. For example, the five users that are separated from the
normal cluster in Window 10 (“Other spam users”) appear
to be isolated spam accounts having similar behaviour to the
Campaign 1 strategy, but on a smaller scale. This also ap-
plies to the single separated user in Window 11. They are
not considered further during this evaluation as they are not
part of a larger campaign.
Further analysis of Campaign 1 revealed that two and
three users were active in Windows 10 and 11 respectively
(five separate users), posting the following comments:
Three most cool things in the World for me before
1 ))))) Jordan–the super star
2 ))))) 66cheap. com–the cheapest shopping site
3 ))))) the iphone – best connector
NOW THERE’S ONE MORE, IT’S THE VIDEO
ABOVE!!!!!!!!!!
Three Best things in the World for me now: ): ): ): ): )
1. Lily——My boyfriend
2. 55cheap. com–the cheapest shopping site
3. the video above—- the most ironical and interesting
video I think:]:]:]:]:] :]:] :]:]
Although there are certain differences between these com-
ments, they are clearly from the same campaign. This be-
haviour is also seen in both windows with Campaign 2, fea-
turing a larger number of users, although there are fewer oc-
currences of identical comments. Nevertheless, a similarity
is noticeable, for example:
Don’t miss this guys, the CEO of apple is releasing
ipads on Thursday: osapple.co.nr
dont miss out. November 17 - new apple ceo is shipping
out old ipad and iphones
Not a lie. Go to this webpage to see what I mean:
bit.ly\vatABm
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Figure 3: Tracking the recurring activity of Campaign 1 (left) and Campaign 2 (right) for all six-hour windows from 14th
November 2011 to 17th November 2011, using a single discriminating motif for each campaign.
Both of these comments are made by the same user in
different windows. However, while the first comment was
accurately marked as spam, the second was not. An assump-
tion here could be that the URL in the first comment is on a
spam blacklist, while the shortened URL in the second en-
ables such a list to be bypassed. Similar shortcomings are
discussed in earlier work (Chhabra et al. 2011).
Discriminating motifs
An inspection of the individual motif counts found that cer-
tain motifs have relatively higher counts for users involved
in the spam campaigns, than those found for regular users.
These motifs may be considered indicative of different cam-
paign strategies, and a subset can be found in Table 3.
Campaign 1 Campaign 2
Motifs
Table 3: A subset of discriminating motifs for different spam
campaign strategies (user nodes are beige, video nodes are
blue).
These discriminating motifs would appear to correlate
with the existing knowledge of the campaign strategies.
Campaign 1 consists of a small number of users commenting
on a large number of videos, and so it would be expected that
motifs containing only one user node with a large number of
video node neighbours have higher counts for the users in-
volved, as is the case here. The motifs considered indicative
of Campaign 2 are more subtle, in that the number of user
and video nodes is similar, with both user and video nodes
present in the set of neighbours for a particular user. How-
ever, all three highlight the fact that users appear to be more
likely to be connected to other users rather than videos. This
makes sense given that with this campaign, a larger number
of users tend to comment on a small number of videos each,
and the potential for connectivity between users is higher
given the similarity of their comments. These motifs would
also appear to indicate that users in the campaign don’t com-
ment on the same videos, as no two users share a video node
neighbour.
Figure 3 contains plots for the counts of two of these mo-
tifs for each of the six-hour windows. The counts were nor-
malised using the edge count for the corresponding window
networks followed by min-max normalization. The fluctu-
ation in counts across the windows appears to track the re-
curring periodic activity of these campaigns, as confirmed
by separate analysis of the data set. This would appear to
corroborate the bursty nature of spam campaigns (Xie et al.
2008; Gao et al. 2010).
Finally, Figure 4 plots the user counts in descending order
for these two motifs in Window 11. With the Campaign 1
motif (left), the first four users are involved and have con-
siderably higher counts than the remaining users. There are
also differences in counts between the campaign users them-
selves, indicating the most active users in this window. All
users plotted for the Campaign 2 motif (right) are indeed
involved. Three of the Campaign 2 users were coloured dif-
ferently to the others, highlighting the fact that none of their
comments were accurately marked as spam. These same
three users can be seen in the right spatialization in Figure
2.
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Figure 4: Users associated with Campaign 1 (left) and Campaign 2 (right), having the highest counts for a single discriminating
motif for each campaign from Window 11 (17th November 2011 10:19:32 to 16:19:32). Note how three of the users in
Campaign 2 are coloured differently, i.e. none of their comments were marked as spam. Users not involved in the campaigns
have been anonymized.
Campaign Analysis
Following the inspection of the discriminating motifs, the
websites and domains associated with the comments posted
by the campaign 1 users were then analyzed. The following
domains were found in the data set in comments beginning
with “Three Best things” and “Three most cool things” (as
seen in the example comments listed in the previous sec-
tion), and can be categorized as follows:
1. National Football League (NFL) merchandise: 2006jer-
seys.com, 66cheap.com, shopofnfl.com.
2. Footwear: 21boots.com.
3. Wider range of merchandise (e.g. clothing, accessories):
36shopping.com, 55cheap.com, 55goods.com.
It is quite clear that all of these sites are related given the
high similarity between them, e.g. various index page titles
containing the text “The Cheapest Shopping Site”, identical
payment options and the same contact email address. There
are also some inconsistencies in the HTML content, for ex-
ample, some 66cheap.com pages refer to shopofnfl.com and
jerseysofnfl.com, and 55cheap.com pages refer to 36shop-
ping.com. Suspicious claims are also made, such as
“SHOPOFNFL.COM was the online shop of NFL”. At first
glance, 21boots.com looks different to the others, but fur-
ther investigation reveals similarities such as the payment
options. The domains appear to have been registered by the
same person6. As 55cheap.com has been previously identi-
fied as a known scam website7, it is safe to assume that all
of these sites should be treated as such.
Further analysis of 55goods.com shows it to be an older
site, as its About page alleges that it has been in operation for
“17 years” since 1993. This would suggest that this scam
6http://whois.domaintools.com
7http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?
qid=20110426143143AArdrbK
has been in operation since 2010 at the very least. It appears
that the About page details contain further inconsistencies,
e.g., 55goods.com states that “In 2009, 78.8% of our an-
nual revenue was from the international market. . . ”, while
55cheap.com, allegedly in operation for “18 years” since
1993 contains the same statement with merely a change in
year: “In 2010, 78,8% of our annual revenue was from the
international market. . . ”.
A total of 24 different user accounts were used to send the
associated comments found in the data set. Although some
of these accounts have been suspended by YouTube, others
remain active. The campaign appears to rotate the existing
accounts for comment posting, and new accounts are created
on a continual basis. The four accounts for this campaign
listed in Figure 4 are currently active as of January 2012. Of
these four, the oldest account was created in August 2011,
while the most recent was created in October 2011.
Conclusions and Future Work
YouTube spam campaigns typically involve a number of
spam bot user accounts controlled by a single spammer
targeting popular videos with similar comments over time.
We have shown that dynamic network analysis methods are
effective for identifying the recurring nature of different
spam campaign strategies, along with the associated user ac-
counts. We have used a characterization of YouTube users
in terms of motifs in the comment network to highlight the
users in question. While the YouTube comment scenario
could be characterized as a network in a number of ways,
we use a network representation comprising user and video
nodes, user-video edges representing comments and user-
user edges representing comment similarity.
The discriminating power of these motif-based character-
izations can be seen in the PCA-based spatialization in Fig-
ure 2. It is also clear from Figure 3 that histograms of cer-
tain discriminating motifs show the level of activity in the
two campaign strategies over time. Furthermore, counts of
these motifs in the egocentric networks of users highlight the
associated accounts (Figure 4).
Future Work
For future experiments, it will be necessary to annotate the
data set with spam/non-spam labels, or perhaps a more ex-
tensive annotation that considers the associated campaign
strategies. Feature selection of a subset of motifs could then
be performed along with subsequent user classification. The
use of a subset of motifs is attractive, as it would remove the
current requirement to count all motif instances found in the
user egocentric networks, which can be a lengthy process.
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